Failed procedures: risk propensity and legitimation of normative expectations in Argentina

Abstract

The political elections, litigation, legislation and decision-making processes are administrative procedures whose primary function is to legitimize decisions binding. If such procedures may carry out its function they need to, like other systems, allow the emergence of uncertainty about the outcome of it. This is an essential structural component of procedures to the extent that contributes to achieve a provision aimed at the widespread acceptance of decisions with binding claim. We begin our exposure showing that the theories of anomie aimed at explaining the problem of transgression of rules in Latin America are a particular way of showing the well known problem of rational-legal legitimacy (I). Within this theoretical context we will make a structural characterization of procedures, their function and we will present the concept of failed procedure (II). The third part is dedicated to the mistrust and to show empirical data that could represent it (III). The fourth part of this work go deep into the cause of this phenomenon showing some of his main defining characteristics: its density and rooted in the expectations (IV). The paper will conclude with reference to the deflation of law as one of the most notable of mistrust (V).